Impacts of Decentralisation – Erosion or Renewal? The Decisive Link between Workplace Representation and Company Size in German and Danish Industrial Relations by Ilsøe, Anna et al.
www.ssoar.info
Impacts of Decentralisation – Erosion or
Renewal? The Decisive Link between Workplace
Representation and Company Size in German and
Danish Industrial Relations
Ilsøe, Anna; Madsen, Jørgen Steen; Due, Jesper
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Rainer Hampp Verlag
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Ilsøe, A., Madsen, J. S., & Due, J. (2007). Impacts of Decentralisation – Erosion or Renewal? The Decisive Link
between Workplace Representation and Company Size in German and Danish Industrial Relations. Industrielle
Beziehungen : Zeitschrift für Arbeit, Organisation und Management, 14(3), 201-222. https://nbn-resolving.org/
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-359540
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Industrielle Beziehungen, 14(3): 201-222 
ISSN (print) 0943-2779, ISSN (internet) 1862-0035, © Rainer Hampp Verlag, www.Hampp-Verlag.de 
Anna Ilsøe, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Jesper Due*
Impacts of Decentralisation – Erosion or Renewal?  
The Decisive Link between Workplace Representation and 
Company Size in German and Danish Industrial Relations**
Abstract – In recent decades Germany and Denmark have constituted survival areas for the 
classical IR system in an era that has otherwise largely been characterised by the deregulation and 
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degrees been possible to observe erosive tendencies in these hitherto sturdy fortresses of “organ-
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Introduction
In recent decades a number of European countries – including Germany and Denmark, 
which are the focal point of the present article1 – have constituted survival areas for the 
classical industrial relations (IR) system in an era that has otherwise largely been charac-
terised by the deregulation and disorganisation of industrial relations. While the systems 
of collective bargaining in countries such as Great Britain and the USA have eroded, it 
proved possible in many European countries in the 1980s and up to the mid-1990s to 
adapt national IR systems to the conditions created by intensified internationalisation.  
This process has been summed up by Traxler (1995) in the concept organised decen-
tralisation. Other researchers – such as Ferner/Hyman (1992, 1998) – have used the 
term coordinated decentralisation. In Denmark we speak of centralised decentralisation (Due et 
al. 1993, 1994) and in Germany the term controlled decentralisation has been used (Schul-
ten 2005).
Organised decentralisation is based on the premise that the collective bargaining 
system can adapt to new requirements so that the resulting regulation ensures viable 
economic solutions both for the private sector and for society as a whole and at the 
same time secures wage earner interests. In some of the national IR systems that ini-
tially adapted to internationalisation it seems over the last decade to have become 
increasingly difficult for the negotiating parties to maintain the functionality and effec-
tiveness of the system. It would now appear that we may be running up against the 
limits of organised decentralisation. From the mid-1990s onwards it has also been 
possible to observe erosive tendencies in the hitherto sturdy fortresses of Denmark 
and Germany (Madsen et al. 2001; Hassel 1999). 
The controlled delegation of bargaining rights within the framework of national 
sector agreements seems to be moving towards a form of multi-level regulation which 
is characterised by individual agreements, collective bargaining and legislation, which
contains trends towards centralisation, decentralisation and internationalisation, and 
which includes many actors with different interests characterised by new norms and 
values. While organised or centralised decentralisation was still characterised by a hie-
rarchic control of a strong top-down nature, multi-level regulation is not necessarily hie-
rarchic. It may feature a “bottom-up” influence instead of “top-down” control. But 
there may also be a changing or non-existent connection between the various levels. It 
is a more horizontal ad hoc form of control  either in the form of market control or of 
                                                          
1  Acknowledgements: A number of colleagues have commented on and made valuable 
suggestions regarding the article. We are especially indebted to Søren Kaj Andersen, FA-
OS, who commented on an earlier version, and Mikkel Mailand, FAOS, who has contri-
buted extremely useful ideas on the theoretical parts. Our special thanks also go to Anke 
Hassel and Rheinhard Bahnmüller, who have made valuable suggestions on the theoreti-
cal and empirical parts respectively. Finally, we would like to thank our colleagues partici-
pating in the workshop “Changes in Labour Market Regulation and Labour and 
Employment Relations: National and Comparative Perspectives” at the 14th IIRA World 
Congress September 11-14 2006, where an earlier version of the article was presented and 
discussed.
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network control. Multi-level regulation is thus characterised by the fact that there is no 
permanent controlling centre. 
The aim of the present article is, therefore, to examine and discuss the conse-
quences of the trends towards multi-level regulation using the German and Danish IR 
models as case studies. If the collective representation of wage earners is not 
strengthened in step with decentralisation, it must be assumed that the result will be 
erosion. This raises questions concerning both the overall control of the central sector 
organisations and the character of enterprise-based regulation as collective agree-
ments. But if new structures are developed locally in a continued interaction with the 
parties at sector level, the collective framework for a labour market regulation may be 
preserved. In this case it may be anticipated that the collective bargaining system will 
be renewed through a shift of emphasis from sector to enterprise level, i.e. an adapta-
tion to the new conditions created by increased international competition.  
This makes Denmark and Germany a natural choice for comparison because the 
two countries’ IR systems differ not least in regard of the way in which local interests 
are represented. The voluntary Danish system has always featured relatively strong 
links between the parties at sector level and the parties at enterprise level. Here we 
have a single-channel system of representation that ties members, union representatives (shop 
stewards) and local union clubs at individual companies to the local trade unions and 
on to the national trade union associations and bargaining cartels at sector level 
(Due/Madsen 2006). This is a considerable resource that trade unions have been able 
to draw upon and develop in the course of the decentralisation process, because it 
creates possibilities for preserving coherence in the safeguarding of interests. 
In contrast to this there is the German legislation-based IR system, in which the 
representation of interests is formally divided through a dual-channel system of representa-
tion. The statutorily guaranteed “Tarifautonomie” at organisation level – and thereby 
regulation via collective bargaining corresponding to the Danish model – is supple-
mented by a statutorily determined local representation system at enterprise level 
through works councils. These councils are elected by and from among the employees 
and are formally separated from the trade unions. Streeck and Müller-Jentsch have 
pointed out that for many decades the German dual system established an effective 
division of labour between sector level bargaining, where agreements on sector-wide 
wage levels and working hours were concluded, and the works councils, which facili-
tated co-determination for employees at company level (Streeck 1992; Müller-Jentsch 
2003). However, decentralisation has undermined this division of labour inasmuch as 
the unions have reluctantly had to accept that the works councils have taken over 
some of the bargaining relations. This requires increased backing from the unions, but 
in a period with steadily declining membership and resources, this support cannot be 
given sufficiently effectively (Müller-Jentsch 2003: 54; Due/Madsen 2003; Zagelmeyer 
2004: 74). 
It is therefore the main thesis of the present article that the dualistic German sys-
tem makes it more difficult for the parties to adapt the bargaining system so that their 
overall coordination can be preserved even though the required decentralisation is 
introduced. In other words the development of multi-level regulation is more liable to 
create a risk of erosion of the bargaining system in Germany than in Denmark, at the 
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same time as the possibilities of renewing the bargaining system are greater in Den-
mark than in Germany.  
We shall examine this thesis through an empirical analysis of the developments 
within two key fields of regulation: pay and working hours. In addition, we shall exam-
ine more tangible indications of problems in the two collective bargaining systems. As 
the idea of organised decentralisation sees the maintenance of high membership rates 
and not least high agreement coverage as prerequisite to a controlled decentralisation 
process, we shall examine the development of these parameters in the two countries. 
High organisation densities and high agreement coverage are signs of stability in the 
bargaining system, and a decline in these parameters can therefore be regarded as 
erosive trends. We shall here restrict ourselves to recent decades and the private sec-
tor, which is the core component of the IR system, inasmuch as although a strongly 
organised public sector may be seen as a stabilising factor, it is the private sector that 
determines long-term developments. First, however, we shall give a brief analysis of 
the drivers behind and the context for the initiation of extensive decentralisation 
processes in the two countries. 
The drivers and contexts of decentralisation in Denmark and Germany 
Tendencies towards decentralisation of collective bargaining have from the 1980s and 
onwards been identified in a large number of countries in the western world. Katz has 
analysed and compared varying decentralisation trends in Sweden, Australia, Ger-
many, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, whereas Traxler has tried to 
identify the direction of change in collective bargaining in 18 OECD countries (Katz 
1993; Traxler 1995). Traxler concludes on the developments in the 1980s that two 
types of decentralisation can be identified, an organised decentralisation in countries 
like Austria, Denmark and West Germany and a disorganised decentralisation in coun-
tries like Great Britain and the United States (Traxler 1995: 16). 
The main reason why we can observe the process of decentralisation across so 
many countries seems to be the continuing intensification of international competi-
tion, which forces employers not only to increase productivity but also to step up the 
introduction of new products. In order to meet these demands many employers have 
introduced new forms of work organisation that enhance flexibility and performance 
at company level. In consequence of this development employers have wished to in-
troduce flexible working hours and new performance-based pay systems as well. Nev-
ertheless, whereas managers can introduce new forms of work organisation on the 
basis of the managerial prerogative, working hours and pay are often subject to sector 
level bargaining. Employers have therefore pushed for decentralisation in order to 
increase the scope of company level bargaining on these important issues.  
The question why we can locate stronger trends towards decentralisation in some 
countries than others has been the subject of some debate. Intensified competition 
can only to a limited extent explain the differences between countries, since most coun-
tries and many branches are heavily exposed to intensified competition. Other factors 
like increased EU regulation or privatisation of public utilities have influenced the 
decentralisation process in the European context, but this does not explain the differ-
ences in decentralisation between European countries. In order to fully grasp the dif-
Industrielle Beziehungen, 14. Jg., Heft 3, 2007   205 
ferences, it appears necessary to focus on the different institutional settings of the 
collective bargaining systems that frame the responses to the challenges of increasing 
competition. 
Here the question of decentralisation relates to the classic discussion on conver-
gence/divergence between national industrial relations systems (Kerr et al. 1960; 
Hall/Soskice 2001; Katz/Darbishire 2000). The pressure from the intensified interna-
tional competition is expected to result in converging decentralisation processes across 
countries, but in reality the pressure is mediated through varying contexts and varying 
strategic choices leading to different forms and contents of decentralisation.  
In order to understand the decentralisation processes in Denmark and Germany 
we need to know more about how the response to intensified competition was framed 
in these two countries. Many factors are involved in initiating the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining, but some are considered more important than others. Katz finds 
evidence for three plausible explanations (drivers) of decentralisation: firstly, shifts in 
bargaining power most often accompanied by weakening of trade unions (the power 
thesis), secondly, spread of new technology and work organisations introducing flexi-
bility and employee participation (the work organisation thesis), and thirdly, decen-
tralisation and diversification of corporate structures/workers interests (the corporate 
structure thesis). Katz concludes on the basis of his case studies of the 1980s that 
although all three theses to varying degrees explain parts of the processes, the work 
organisation thesis has the strongest explanatory power with regard to the six coun-
tries examined.  
The Danish and German experience supports the view that Katz´ theses should 
not be interpreted as mutually exclusive but rather as complementary. The work or-
ganisation thesis has powerful relevance for both countries (as for many others), since 
it has been the changing needs for flexibility and performance at company level in 
consequence of increased international competition that have made employers push 
for decentralisation. A core example of this bottom-up process is the development of 
deviating practices for working hours in Danish and German companies throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. However, this explanation cannot on its own ex-
plain the actual timing of the decentralisation process, which differs in the two coun-
tries. In order to explain the different timing in the Danish and German contexts, we 
have to take a closer look at the response at sector level to the employers’ push for 
decentralisation.  
In both countries the process of decentralisation was initiated in times of eco-
nomic crisis and rising unemployment related to the increasing pressure of interna-
tional competition. In Denmark this occurred in the 1970s and 1980s, whereas it took 
place in Germany in the 1990s (also influenced by the economic crisis in the wake of 
reunification) (Hassel 1999: 484). But the exact timing of the introduction of decen-
tralisation schemes in the sector level agreements depended strongly on developments 
at sector level. 
In Germany the decentralisation was initiated in the context of the severely weak-
ened position of the trade unions, which supports Katz´ power thesis. From the mid-
nineties and onwards a growing asymmetry in the German membership rates could be 
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identified (much lower union densities than membership rates for the employers’ or-
ganisations) (Müller-Jentsch/Weitbrecht 2003; Carley 2005; Ebbinghaus 2000; Lesch 
2004; Jacobi 2003). Option clauses and later more comprehensive opening clauses (i.e. 
the Pforzheim agreement from 2004) were introduced in a way that allowed trade 
unions to keep some control of developments. The use of the more comprehensive 
clauses was conditional on the control and approval of the social partners leaving 
especially smaller and less unionised companies with little chance of implementing 
them (see below). This can be interpreted as the weakened unions’ response to the 
pressure from (larger) companies in a labour market with a dualistic system of repre-
sentation at company level. In times of falling union densities – especially at smaller 
companies – the trade union will lose control if the bargaining is decentralised to less 
unionised companies. At larger companies, where the union density remained high, 
some control could still be sustained, but time was short. Some of the larger compa-
nies were already deviating from the sector level agreement through so-called closet 
agreements2 (especially on the subject of flexible working hours) forcing the trade 
union to introduce decentralisation schemes in order to keep control at these sites. 
In Denmark the explanation for the introduction of the decentralisation schemes 
in the late 1980s must be found elsewhere. Even though the trade unions’ position 
had been weakened owing to the economic crisis and rising unemployment rates over 
more than a decade, union density did not fall as in Germany (Carley 2005; Ebbing-
haus 2000; Lesch 2004; LO 2005). Decentralisation schemes were not introduced until 
a power struggle within and between the employers´ organisations and the trade un-
ions was resolved at the end of the 1980s. This suggests that another thesis should be 
added to Katz’ theory on drivers of decentralisation, the intra- and inter-organisational 
thesis, in which power struggles concerning the structure of the collective bargaining 
system can determine the exact timing of a decentralisation process. This thesis is 
inspired by Sissons’ theory on the role of employers´ organisations in generating col-
lective bargaining systems, but it goes one step further. Sisson points out that the 
organisation on the employers’ side determines the level of collective bargaining and 
thereby also the power structures within the trade unions. The Danish case demon-
strates that this is not the whole story. As our investigation of the creation and devel-
opment of the Danish collective bargaining system has shown, the employers do not 
determine the level of bargaining unilaterally. The level is a result of a complex strug-
gle, in which inter-organisational alliances between certain trade unions and certain 
employers’ organisations often play a crucial role (Sisson 1987; Due et al. 1994; 
Mailand Simonsen 1996).
From the late 1970s and onwards there was a struggle within both the federation 
of the Danish employers’ organisations (DA) and the federation of Danish trade un-
ions (LO) to determine whether the collective bargaining should continue to take 
place under the control of the main organisations or confederations at nationwide 
level or should be decentralised to the sector level. There were many different inter-
                                                          
2  The concept of closet agreements refers to company level agreements that are bargained 
between management and workers’ representatives but are concealed from the trade uni-
ons because of their deviating content. 
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ests across the sectors (small trade unions/employers’ organisations vs. larger ones). 
The struggle continued up through the 1980s until an organisational reform on the 
employers’ side created a new, strong association, the Confederation of Danish Indus-
tries (DI). An alliance was concluded between the DI and a new bargaining cartel on 
the employee side, the Central Organisation of Industrial Employees in Denmark 
(CO-Industri), creating a system with trendsetting centralised bargaining in the indus-
trial sector from the early 1990s. The final outcome of the battle was a centralised decen-
tralisation of the Danish collective bargaining system (Due et al. 1994; Due/Madsen 
2006). Trade unions had confidence in their ability to agree on comprehensive decen-
tralisation schemes in relation to the reform, because the system of representation at 
company level had traditionally been strong in Denmark. The single-channel system 
allowed a direct link between the trade unions and company level bargaining, and the 
take-up of the system (especially the election of shop stewards) was high even among 
smaller companies (see below). Furthermore, unlike the German works councils, the 
shop stewards had already at that time attained comprehensive bargaining rights at 
company level. This had to do with the highly decentralised bargaining on wages (de-
veloped up through the 20th century), and the reproduction of the central bargaining 
system’s negotiating culture at company level concurrently with this process. 
While the sector level developments seem to have played an important role for 
the exact timing of the far-reaching decentralisation schemes in Denmark and Ger-
many (following the intra- and inter-organisational thesis and the power thesis respec-
tively), other institutional developments also appear to have influenced the shape and 
outcome of the decentralisation processes. The system of representation at company 
level shows an important interaction with the development at sector level, to which 
we shall return later. 
Coverage of collective agreements, membership rates and the question 
of size
The coverage of collective agreements gives an immediate impression of the extent of 
regulation by collective agreement. But, at least in the long term, the precondition for 
preserving high coverage seems to be strong organisations for both employees and 
employers because the legitimacy of the system can only be preserved through suffi-
cient representation (Visser 2005: 297). If we turn first to the trend in agreement cov-
erage in Denmark  see Table 1  no sign of erosion can be observed. On the con-
trary, against the background of a rise in the 1990s it has proved possible to keep cov-
erage at a high level.3
As late as in the mid-1990s there was in Western Germany a clearly higher cover-
age than in Denmark, while in Eastern Germany it was almost on a par with the Dan-
                                                          
3  In the 1990´s the coverage of the collective agreements in Denmark was subject to much 
debate, because the calculations of the coverage were not very precise. One survey by 
Scheuer suggested levels between 50 and 60 percent (Scheuer 1994), but this was correc-
ted in his later surveys, which concluded levels to be between 70 and 80 percent (Scheuer 
2000, 2004). From the end of the 1990´s DA has conducted yearly calculations reaching 
conclusions similar to those of Scheuer’s later surveys.   
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ish level. Today, after a marked decline the level even in the western part of Germany 
is substantially lower than in Denmark with just below two-thirds of wage earners in 
Western Germany against just over three-quarters in Denmark. The trend away from 
collective bargaining is particularly marked in Eastern Germany, where it has not 
proved possible to raise the level since reunification, so that, on the contrary, it has 
been in something resembling free fall with the result that in 2004 only half of all wage 
earners were covered by a collective agreement. 
Table 1: Coverage of collective agreements* in the private sector by establishments 
and number of employees in Germany (West and East) and Denmark 1995-
2004
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
             Western Germany              Eastern Germany                        Denmark 
 1995 2001 2004 1996 2001 2004 1997 2001 2004 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Establishments 62% 48% 43% 43% 28% 23%  
Employees 83% 71% 66% 73% 56% 50% 76% 77% 77% 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Müller-Jentsch/Weitbrecht 2003; Dribbusch 2005a; DA 1998, 2002, 2005. 
* Collective agreements concluded at both sector level (multiemployer bargaining) and enterprise 
level (single employer bargaining). Danish figures are available only for the number of wage earn-
ers calculated as fulltime employees. 
Union membership in Denmark has almost always been proportionally higher than in 
Germany, and this difference has increased in recent years  even though the Danish 
unions have begun to lose members. Union density in Denmark is still close to a level 
where 8 out of 10 wage earners are organised, while this is the case for less than one in 
four German wage earners (Müller-Jentsch/Weitbrecht 2003; Carley 2005; Ebbing-
haus 2000; Lesch 2004; LO 2005). 
In Denmark it has caused concern that especially LO, which primarily covers the 
group of skilled and unskilled workers, has lost members. On the other hand, the two 
other major organisations, FTF (the Confederation of Salaried Employees and Civil 
Servants in Denmark) and AC (the Danish Confederation of Professional Associa-
tions), which organise wage earners with further and higher education, has grown 
steadily into the new century, so it is only quite recently that the total number of union 
members has fallen marginally. 
The Danish concern about union density is set in relief if we compare the two IR 
systems’ core areas, the organisations in the iron and metal industries. Here, for ex-
ample, IG Metall in Germany lost 26.6% of its members in the period 1991-1997 
alone, and the decline has continued since then, although it has slowed down a bit in 
recent years. Where IG Metall lost 4% of its members from 2004 to 2005, the loss 
from 2005 to 2006 was 2% (Zagelmeyer 1998; Dribbusch 2005b; Beese 2006). In 
comparison the bargaining federation or cartel for Danish manufacturing industries, 
the Central Organisation of Industrial Employees in Denmark, lost only 1.6% of its 
members in the period 2000-2005 (www.co-industri.dk). 
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As might be expected, the size of the workplace is a decisive parameter for 
agreement coverage. In both countries coverage is lowest in small firms and highest in 
the big companies  a factor that will become especially problematic in a decentralisa-
tion process (Dribbusch 2005a; Scheuer/Madsen 2000; DA 2005). 
Another important aspect of agreement coverage is the difference between sectors,
where the levels of coverage in both Germany and Denmark are high in the traditional 
manufacturing industries and considerably lower in the service sector (Dribbusch 
2005a; Scheuer/Madsen 2000; DA 2005). With the changes in the private sector 
brought about by increased international competition, there has been a shift from 
manufacturing to service, in particular to modern service enterprises in information 
technology, etc. In these new fields it is difficult for the unions to organise the em-
ployees and secure agreements. Precise figures are not available, but there are indica-
tions that it is easier in Denmark with its high union density to cover these fields as 
well (Marginson et al. 2003; Müller-Jentsch/Weitbrecht 2003; Due and Madsen 2003). 
Even though the Danish model is under pressure in consequence of structural 
changes in the private sector, the problem appears to be far more pronounced in 
Germany: “In Germany by contrast the new ICT economy is said to be ‘essentially an 
agreement-free space’.” (Marginson/Sisson 2004: 201). 
It must be premised that the sector level agreements are of decisive importance 
for the maintenance of centralised/controlled decentralisation in the two countries. 
The control of regulation exerted by the collective bargaining system takes place not 
least through the broad coverage of sector level agreements. It is therefore worth not-
ing  see Table 2  that in Germany there has been a certain weakening of the sector 
level bargaining system in the trends exhibited by the agreement system as a whole 
over the past decade. The number of employees covered by sector level agreements 
only (multi employer bargaining) has been shrinking as well. 
Table 2: Number of employees covered by association-level* agreements in Germany 
1995-2004
         Western Germany     Eastern Germany  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 1995 2001 2004  1996 2001 2004 
Employees 73%  63%  55%   56%  44%  36% 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Müller-Jentsch/Weitbrecht 2003, Dribbusch 2005a. 
* Association-level agreements here refer to collective agreements concluded at sector level. 
Although the German sector level agreements are still of great importance for wages 
and working conditions in the companies covered, there has nevertheless been a de-
cline in their importance even in these companies owing to an increasing use of open-
ing clauses (see below). Opening clauses have especially been used to conclude com-
pany level agreements on working hours and the so-called “pacts for employment and 
competitiveness” (Seifert/Massa-Wirth 2005). While it can still be said that the 
framework for these agreements is to a high degree concluded at sector level, what we 
210 Anna Ilsøe, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Jesper Due: Impacts of Decentralisation – Erosion or Renewal? 
increasingly see in reality are renegotiations between the parties at the local level, so 
that management and the works councils have assumed a growing influence on the 
content of collective negotiations (Schulten 2005; Dribbusch 2005a).
    In view of this development, it is a reasonable question if a single sector level 
agreement can meet the diversity of demands for regulation, for instance among com-
panies of different size, found within a whole sector. If you compare company sizes in 
Denmark and Germany, you will not at first glance find great differences, since the 
industrial sectors of both countries are dominated by small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SME’s). Less than two percent of companies in both countries had 250 em-
ployees or more in year 2000 and were thereby classified as large companies. Compar-
ing the number of employees within each company, however, gives us a quite differ-
ent picture. In Germany 10 percent points more employees than in Denmark were 
employed in large companies (see Table 3).  
Table 3: Company sizes* in the Denmark and Germany year 2000  
(industry and energy sectors)   
       Percent of companies                              Percent of employees  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
    Micro Small   Medium Large Micro Small   Medium  Large 
Denmark 75,5 18,2     5,0 1,3 8,8 19,2      26,5 45,5 
Germany 67,2 23,8     7,2 1,9 7,2 14,5 23,0 55,4  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: European Commission 2003 (figures from Eurostat).  
* Company sizes are based on the number of employees: Micro (1-9), small (10-49), medium (50-
249) and large (250+). 
The figures indicate that the main difference between the structure of the Danish and 
German industry is the large presence of mega size companies in Germany (for in-
stance German automotive companies). The sector level agreement is therefore faced 
with greater heterogeneity at company level, which might make it more difficult to 
meet the regulatory needs adequately in all companies (Streeck 2004: 11). Tradition-
ally, smaller firms have preferred sector level bargaining in order to save regulatory 
costs, whereas larger firms have pushed for decentralisation to increase the scope for 
local adjustments of the regulation (and thereby savings on operational costs). Smaller 
firms do not have the workers representation at enterprise level (union representation, 
works councils) or the organisational back up for management (HRM departments) to 
institutionalise company level bargaining. The resources needed to implement some of 
this bargaining could well by far exceed the savings and improvements achieved from 
introducing locally adjusted solutions within the framework of the sector level agree-
ment.
This discrepancy between firms in times of decentralisation may be smaller in a 
country like Denmark with a less heterogeneous composition of company sizes. The 
sector level agreement has traditionally been faced with very few mega size companies, 
which favours a form of overall regulation more in accord with the needs and capaci-
ties of smaller firms. In order to make use of the possibilities for company level bar-
gaining in smaller firms it is, however, still necessary to have a platform for institu-
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tionalising such bargaining especially on the side of the employees (works councils, 
shop stewards).   
Representation at enterprise level 
As a result of the high degree of decentralisation local representation is becoming ever 
more important for the unions’ possibilities of preserving the collective agreements at 
sector level. In both countries there is in particular a lack of representation at the small 
establishments, and as the structure of the private sector in both countries is at the 
same time characterised by a preponderance of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
this carries with it an immediate risk that the decentralisation of the agreements sys-
tem will lead to major problems.  
In Germany the local representation of worker interests takes place primarily in 
the works councils, the establishment of which can be demanded at enterprises with 
five or more employees. In fact a mere 10% of such enterprises have works councils. 
The difference between large and small enterprises is marked, inasmuch as only 7% of 
the small enterprises with up to 50 employees in East and West Germany have works 
councils, while the figures for enterprises with more than 200 employees are 80% in 
the West and 75% in the East respectively (Dribbusch 2005a). The Danish work 
councils or co-operation committees in the private sector can be established in enter-
prises with more than 35 employees, and it is estimated that at least 70% of these 
enterprises have in fact set up such committees (Jørgensen 2003). In general, then, 
coverage is higher in Denmark than in Germany. In respect of small enterprises, a 
sector study shows that consultation committees are to be found in 10% of the enter-
prises with less than 35 employees (www.hkprivat.dk).  
In Germany 53% of wage earners in the West and 62% in the East are employed 
at enterprises without works councils (Dribbusch 2005a). Although works councils 
also are evaporating owing to a higher direct employee participation in the new work 
organisations, this is a serious problem for organised decentralisation, since the coun-
cils constitute the primary local channel of collective representation. The lack of cov-
erage becomes even more problematic in Germany, because it is accompanied by a 
very low union density – the second pillar in the dual German structure (Hassel 1999: 
502).
It should be added that the Danish co-operation committees are only a supple-
mentary instrument for obtaining influence on pay, working time, etc. The primary 
representation of employee interests is undertaken by the shop stewards, who have a 
key function in the implementation and administration of the collective agreements, 
and who form an integral part of the general bargaining structure. For the Danish 
trade union movement the outcome of decentralisation will primarily depend on how 
finely meshed the network of union representatives is. There are no precise figures on 
the number of shop stewards, but as the co-operation committees are linked with the 
system of union representatives, it may be concluded that this network covers at least 
as much ground as that covered by the committees. A conservative estimate is that 
not less than 80% of Danish employees are covered by shop stewards. The represen-
tative system is thus more deeply and closely connected with the bargaining system in 
Denmark than in Germany. There is still a problem in Denmark with a number of 
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small enterprises that lack formal representation. However, they are to some extent 
brought into the system via the tight network of links to their members at these 
workplaces that many local unions have built up and developed (Jensen et al. 1999). 
Decentralisation of wage bargaining 
When it comes to wage negotiations there are marked differences between the Danish 
and German collective agreement systems. It is not least in this area that the otherwise 
centralised Danish IR system has historically been characterised by a high degree of 
decentralisation. From the establishment of the system at the threshold of the 20th
century a flexible wage system has been evolved at the heart of the collective bargain-
ing system  the iron and metal industry. Since 1902 it is only the minimum wage 
tariff that has been negotiated at sector level, while the actual wage increases have 
been negotiated between the parties at the various enterprises. As part of the devel-
opment of centralised decentralisation around 1990 the flexible wage system was ex-
tended to other areas, so that in the private sector, which is covered by the two big 
main organisations or confederations LO and DA, 85% of wage earners are under the 
flexible wage system and only 15% receive, the so-called normal tariff, by which wages 
are to a high degree determined at sector level (Due/Madsen 2006). 
In Denmark decentralisation in the field of wages has developed into a form of 
multi-level regulation, in which both sector and workplace levels play a role in deter-
mining the rate of wage increases at the individual enterprise. Even though the aver-
age wage increase ends up close to the increase in the minimum wage negotiated in 
the sector level agreement, wage levels and wage increases can vary considerably from 
enterprise to enterprise. There is thus a potential for substantial flexibility in the regu-
lation of wages that permits adaptation to local conditions, but wage bargaining is at 
the same time developed into a horizontal coordination by (the network of) union 
representatives across Denmark, which from the viewpoint of employers may inhibit 
flexibility.
Denmark has a long tradition of such networks generated through local unions, 
union clubs, shop stewards and personal relations. They have developed in step with 
the flexible wage system. Because of the increasing demands confronting union repre-
sentatives as a result of internationalisation the networks are of great importance for 
the working out of local solutions  as also documented in other studies among union 
representatives in Denmark (Kristensen 2003). These networks can therefore be re-
garded as enhancing a sustainable decentralisation, since the exchange of resources 
and experience in these networks helps union representatives to co-operate with 
management in reaching solutions adapted to local conditions within the framework 
of the sector level agreement. This trend towards multi-level regulation thus points in 
the direction of a renewal of the collective bargaining system in Denmark. 
Decentralisation opens up the possibility of horizontal regulation at the local level as 
an integrated supplement to the sector level agreement.  
In Germany there are signs of similar network formations. An interview study of 
enterprises in the metal industries of Denmark and Germany in 2005 revealed that not 
only Danish shop stewards but also a number of German workers representatives 
(Betriebsräte) from works councils in Baden Württemberg participated in regional 
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networks (Ilsøe 2006).4 These networks in Germany have also been documented in 
other studies (Glassmann 2004).  
The exchange of experience and the support encountered by the German Be-
triebsräte in the networks were in their view particularly important for smaller enter-
prises, which have few resources for formulating local agreements. This lack of re-
sources among employees at German enterprises also appears from a recent survey 
among Betriebsräte, where the majority (53%) answer that they find it difficult to 
tackle decentralisation, among other things because it strengthens the position of 
management and leads to a polarisation among employees as a consequence of differ-
entiated pay and working conditions (Dribbusch 2005c). It is, however, an open ques-
tion to what extent small and medium-sized enterprises in Germany participate in 
networks and receive feedback from large enterprises that are pioneering the new 
trends. The networks with which we have been in contact have primarily consisted of 
Betriebsräte from larger enterprises, which had, moreover, very limited knowledge of 
smaller enterprises in their area (Ilsøe 2006). 
Wage increases are negotiated somewhat differently in Germany and in Denmark. 
In Germany the real wage increase is determined in the sector level agreement and is 
not subject to local bargaining at individual enterprises (except in cases of single em-
ployer bargaining). Nevertheless, the legislatively regulated Günstigkeitsprinzip does 
offer the possibility of agreeing better conditions for employees locally on specific 
points in the sector level agreement (Tarifvertragsgesetz: § 4). Here, improvements 
have to date been interpreted as absolute improvements on specific elements and not 
as improvements that form part of a major trade off, by which employees for instance 
accept working longer hours without an increase in pay but receive other benefits 
instead. This has, however, given rise to much discussion, since employers would like 
to see a broader interpretation of this Günstigkeitsprinzip. The employers have, how-
ever, not yet succeeded in changing the interpretation, since the principle is regulated 
by law, and they have not been able to make use of the weakened position of the trade 
unions without support from the state. 
In respect of pay, the principle has so far been used to raise wages or to add extra 
bonuses or Christmas and holiday allowances to the agreed wage in order to pay em-
ployees over and above the sector level agreement (Hassel 1999: 486). These supple-
ments are negotiated with the works councils. Over time this has led to the develop-
ment of a wage gap between enterprises that are able to pay extra and those that may 
find it difficult enough to meet the sector-agreed wage increases. Figures from 2000 
show that roughly every second enterprise in the West and every fifth in the East pay 
more than the sector level agreement, but in general this trend is receding. On average 
wages are 11-12% above the level of the sector level agreement at these enterprises 
(Schnabel 2003: 97-98).  
                                                          
4  In 2005 Anna Ilsøe carried out an interview study among management and employee 
representatives at 10 Danish and German (Baden-Württemberg) metal companies (Ilsøe 
2006). In addition, interviews were conducted with regional and national representatives 
of the relevant union and employer associations. 
214 Anna Ilsøe, Jørgen Steen Madsen, Jesper Due: Impacts of Decentralisation – Erosion or Renewal? 
It is especially larger enterprises that are able to pay more, and the structure of 
wage bargaining has therefore proved problematic for small and medium-sized enter-
prises (Hassel 1999: 500-501). In the first place, they have less economic room for 
manoeuvre than large enterprises and therefore greater difficulty in handling a fixed 
wage rise in times of crisis. With their more limited resources small enterprises may 
find it harder to find the money for a general pay increase of, say, five percent. Sec-
ond, many of the large enterprises play a decisive role in the negotiations for the sec-
tor level agreement, which means that the sector-determined pay increase probably 
ends up closer to their possibilities for rewarding their employees.  
All in all, the historically highly decentralised wage negotiations in Denmark have 
contributed to the development of an enterprise-based bargaining system as an impor-
tant element in the overall regulation of pay via the sector level agreements. This de-
velopment has been strengthened in the past decade. In Germany wage negotiations 
have always had and still have a far more centralised character, and sector level bar-
gaining has in reality been setting the level of a maximum wage as opposed to the 
Danish minimum wage. The possibilities of adapting agreements to the situation of 
the individual enterprise continue to be limited. This is particularly a problem for 
small and medium-sized enterprises and has probably contributed to the fall in agree-
ment coverage and the erosion of the German system because the lack of flexibility 
increases the potential for conflict between the parties and motivates such enterprises 
to seek to avoid collective regulation (Hassel 1999:500, 501-503). 
Local adjustment of working hours via opening clauses 
Decentralisation of sector level agreements takes place in both countries via a number 
of opening clauses in the actual agreements that permit local negotiation of, for exam-
ple, working hours and thereby a more flexible and locally adjusted regulation in the 
labour market. There are a number of different types of opening clauses, such as hard-
ship clauses, location clauses and option clauses (Jacobi 2003: 35-36). However, the 
way in which they are formed looks somewhat different in the two countries. 
The so-called hardship clauses have the longest history in both Denmark and 
Germany. This is the possibility of negotiating an (often radically alternative) local 
agreement between the union and the enterprise in the event of insolvency or the like, 
so that the workplace can be preserved. In the German metal industry these clauses 
were written into the sector level agreements in the mid-1990s, but in reality they were 
used only to a limited extent because the unions were reluctant to recognise hardship 
situations, and management was reluctant to give unions full access to information 
concerning the enterprises’ economic situation. There was simply a lack of trust be-
tween the parties (Hassel 1999: 497). 
Location clauses, which are in contrast a more recent phenomenon in both 
Denmark and Germany, by definition permit highly alternative agreements at individ-
ual enterprises without the requirement of acute crisis (Jacobi 2003: 35-36). In Germany 
there is a form of location clause in the metal industry, by which the so-called Pforz-
heim Agreement from 2004 makes it possible to negotiate substantial departures from 
the sector level agreement (Ergänzungstarifverträge) in respect of, for instance, pay 
and working hours, if this can strengthen the enterprises’ competitiveness and secure 
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employment. This is, however, conditional on the regional employer associations and 
unions participating in the negotiations and endorsing the final agreement. In practice 
therefore it can be difficult to distinguish the use of hardship and location clauses 
from one another. In Denmark the so-called Pilot Schemes in the collective agree-
ment for the manufacturing industry make it possible, given local agreement, to com-
pletely disregard four chapters  for example, the chapter on working hours  without
the requirement of the sector level parties’ control and endorsement (Industrial 
Agreement 2004: §50; Collective Agreement for Technical and Administrative Salaried 
Employees 2004: §25). This form of location clause has existed since 2000, but it was 
only in 2004 that control by the parties at sector level ceased to be a requirement. The 
Pilot Schemes will, however, only be renewed in this form at the next bargaining 
round in 2007 if the sector level parties agree on it. Unlike their German colleagues 
Danish shop stewards have a de facto right of veto that gives them a braking mecha-
nism in relation to agreements at the local level under the Pilot Schemes. In Germany 
the corresponding mechanism is situated outside the enterprise in the requirement for 
the sector level parties’ control and endorsement of the use of Pforzheim.  
This kind of clause is proportionally more used among companies in Denmark 
than in Germany, although the number of employees covered is higher in Germany. 5
The company level agreements concluded in Germany as a result of the decentralisa-
tion process have proved to be much more radical than the Danish company level 
agreements. To date no company level agreements on working time without pay have 
been concluded in Denmark, whereas there are several examples of this in Germany 
(for instance at Siemens and at DaimlerChrysler in 2004). This could be explained by 
the absence of pay flexibility in the German collective bargaining system motivating 
employers in the industry to sneak pay flexibility through the back door of working 
time flexibility in times of massive international competition. However, it must be said 
that the general application of location clauses is relatively limited in both countries, 
and that such alternative possibilities cannot alone constitute the driving force behind 
decentralisation on working hours. 
Both German and Danish sector level agreements contain a wide range of option 
clauses, which  as indicated by the name  refer to clauses in the sector level agree-
ment, by which local parties can choose between specified possibilities or are free to 
develop solutions within the framework of the chapters on working time (Jacobi 2003: 
35-36).6 In Denmark some of these clauses were introduced as early as in the 1980s 
(against the background of a rising number of closet agreements), when a number of 
                                                          
5   In October 2005 a total of 281 Ergänzungstarifverträge were registered under Pforzheim 
throughout Germany  (Gesamtmetall 2005: 19). For the manufacturing industry in Den-
mark, by way of comparison, approx. 40 so-called Pilot Schemes departing from the 
chapter on working hours had been concluded in June 2005. The last figure is an estimate 
calculated by CO-industri and DI. 
6  Manteltarifvertrag 1997: §7.5-7.6. Tarifvertrag zur Änderung der Manteltarifverträge und 
der Tarifverträge zur Beschäftigungssicherung in Baden-Württemberg 2004. Industrial 
Agreement 2004: §9; Collective Agreement for Technical and Administrative Salaried 
Employees 2004: §8. 
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decentralisation schemes were implemented in response to an intensifying economic 
and employment crisis.  
In both countries option clauses are widely used to introduce flexible working 
hours at company level. Surveys from 2004-2005 show, that 51% of all companies in 
Germany and 51% of all companies in Denmark make use of flexible working hours 
(Riedmann et al. 2006: 4). Other surveys show that flexible working hours also prove 
to be widespread when we look solely at companies covered by collective agreements. 
More than half of the German enterprises covered by collective agreements in the 
private sector have used option clauses to implement flexible working hours (Drib-
busch 2005c). In Denmark (where the corresponding figure applies only to the indus-
trial sector) this is the case for about one-third of Danish enterprises covered by col-
lective agreements.7
In some ways it is surprising that flexible working hours appear to be as wide-
spread in Germany as in Denmark, inasmuch as the German regulation system is tra-
ditionally described as more rigid than the Danish, but it makes good sense when 
looking at the wider range of possibilities for flexibility in the two countries. Where 
the Danish flexicurity model gives greater scope for external numerical flexibility (hir-
ing and firing), German legislation makes it very difficult and expensive for German 
employers to make use of this form of flexibility, and they therefore have to turn to 
more internal forms of flexibility such as flexible working hours (OECD 2004: 70-72; 
Andersen/ Mailand 2005: 11-14). This is also reflected in a generally lower mobility in 
the German labour market.8
Decentralisation in the field of working hours seems, however, to have greater 
depth in Denmark. One might perhaps even speak of a trend towards individualisa-
tion, underpinned by, among other things, a possibility in the sector level agreement 
from 2004 for entering into local framework agreements on flexible working hours, 
under which individual agreements can be concluded. There also appears to be a trend 
towards individualisation of the day-to-day administration of working hours in Den-
mark. In this way Danish wage earners experience to a slightly higher degree than 
German wage earners that they can have an influence on their own working hours 
(Ilsøe 2006; www.europeansocialsurvey.org). This may be seen as an expression of a 
reciprocal trust between employees and management. The somewhat stronger mutual 
trust in the Danish case might be explained by the stronger presence of works coun-
cils and shops stewards securing a power balance between management and employ-
ees at company level.  
Even though the probably most important reason for the restricted use of hard-
ship and location clauses is that enterprises can attain considerable flexibility through 
the widespread option clauses, a number of other factors may be involved. One of 
them may be the difficulty connected with using clauses at small and medium-size 
                                                          
7  The figure is a result from an internal survey in DI and was given to us during an inter-
view with a representative from DI.  
8  Earlier studies indicate that half of all employees in Denmark have seniority of 4 years or 
less, while half of all employees in Germany have a seniority of 11 years or more (OECD 
1995).
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enterprises. Thus, of the 281 company level agreements under Pforzheim concluded 
in Germany by October 2005 only 68 were entered into within the group of enter-
prises with up to 200 employees (Gesamtmetall 2005: 19). In comparison a total of 
69.7% of enterprises had fewer than 100 employees in the metal and electric industry 
alone in year 2004 (www.gesamtmetall.de). This might therefore suggest that small and 
medium-sized enterprises do not have the same possibilities for concluding alternative 
agreements as large enterprises – perhaps because they have fewer resources. It seems 
not unlikely that this is a problem in Germany, because, as already noted, the occur-
rence of works councils is far smaller than the occurrence of co-operation committees 
and shop stewards in Denmark, and the use of opening clauses presupposes local 
representation of the employees, i.e. some kind of institutionalisation of the bargain-
ing system at enterprise level.  
The restricted use of Pforzheim at smaller enterprises in Germany may also have 
to do with the circumstance that in Germany, as opposed to Denmark, the unions are 
required to participate in negotiations and control the outcome. In connection with 
our interview study in Baden-Württemberg in autumn 2005 a leader from a metal 
company with about 1500 employees commented that he found it difficult to get IG 
Metall to accept his wish to use Pforzheim, as he was unable to exert the same pres-
sure on the union in respect of securing employment as larger enterprises (Ilsøe 2006). 
This suggests that the process of decentralisation in Germany mainly has been driven 
by managers of mega size companies and adjusted to their needs. 
In respect of flexible working hours it must be concluded that local possibilities 
within the framework of the sector level agreements are very comprehensive in both 
Germany and Denmark. According to Schulten the German unions’ belief that they 
can retain their influence through a controlled decentralisation has proved to be an 
illusion (Schulten 2005). It is doubtful whether the sector level agreements give the 
Danish organisations a stronger grip on developments. Here we have a situation 
where the real decisions take place at enterprise level in both countries. But in Den-
mark there is a general confidence that the collective basis can continue to be secured 
through the local union representatives’ negotiation rights, i.e. the belief that multi-
level regulation will lead to renewal rather than erosion.  
Conclusion 
Comparative IR research rightly places Denmark and Germany, despite their differ-
ences, in the group of countries that through co-ordinated decentralisation processes 
resisted the pressure from increased international competition on the collective 
agreement systems. But the point of the present article is that over the last decade, in 
which the pressure from international competition has intensified, the two IR models 
have moved in different directions.
The German system seems to have had greater difficulty in adapting to the new 
conditions and therefore exhibits clear signs of erosion (falling membership rates and 
agreement coverage, company level agreements on working hours without pay), while 
in spite of incipient problems the Danish system has continued to be able to resist the 
pressure through adjustments that have made it possible to preserve the coordinating 
role of the sector organisations and the collective character of the system in the face 
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of continued decentralisation. This can be ascribed to the single-channel system of 
representation at Danish companies with a widespread presence of shop stewards 
who (unlike the German works councils) have substantial bargaining rights. Further-
more, there is in the Danish system  to a higher degree than in the German system 
a platform for renewal in the local networks originally formed in relation to decentral-
ised wage bargaining. These networks might be a platform for the evolution of hori-
zontal coordination processes. The centralised decentralisation, which continued to be 
marked by the sector organisations’ hierarchical control, is developing into a multi-
level regulation in which coordination also takes place through bottom-up processes, 
but in such a way that the unions’ overall control does not disappear. All in all, there is 
a stronger and more clear-cut representation of the workforce at enterprise level in 
Denmark. To this it might be added, that the relations between employees and man-
agement would seem to be more trust-based and consensus seeking in Denmark than 
in Germany (perhaps as a reflection of the different systems of representation and 
their different take-up). This is exemplified, as mentioned above, by the problems 
experienced in Germany in making use of opening clauses because of lack of trust 
between the parties, and the greater self-determination enjoyed by employees in Den-
mark in the administration of the flexible working hours. 
It is also possible to observe tentative trends towards renewal in Germany. A 
number of studies have concluded that the German works councils (Betriebsräte) 
remain a relative stable institution in larger companies, and that some of these works 
councils frame new and integrative forms of bargaining in step with decentralisation 
(Kotthoff 1998; Frege 2002; Klikauer 2002; Behrens/Jacoby 2004; Haipeter/ 
Lehndorff 2005). It is in our view here important to underline that the weak take-up 
of works councils among SMEs also remains relatively stable and the potential for 
renewal seems to be present only in the very largest of companies. These enterprises 
play a decisive role in the sector negotiations, and decentralisation is to a large extent 
adapted to their conditions with high collective agreement coverage, organisation 
densities and strong employee representation  even though it is perhaps the small 
and medium-sized enterprises that have most need for flexible solutions in respect of 
wages and working hours.
It is our conclusion that differences in representation at enterprise level and the 
accompanying difference in negotiating cultures constitute an important part of the 
explanation for the erosion-versus-renewal phenomenon in the two models. But in 
light of the analyses of the present article another important explanation must be 
added. In our view, it is the combination of the heterogeneity of the industrial sector 
(many mega size companies in a structure with a preponderance of SMEs) and the 
dual system of representation that makes it difficult to avoid erosion of the collective 
bargaining system in Germany. Therefore our thesis is only partly confirmed.  
The dual structure of the German system of representation makes in itself the 
German collective bargaining system vulnerable to erosion in the process of decen-
tralisation. The structure makes it more difficult to develop a consensus oriented bar-
gaining culture between management and trade unions, because there will always be a 
natural fear of loosing influence from the side of the trade unions. This makes the 
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platform for company level bargaining less solid and reduces the survival capacity of 
the overall bargaining system in times of weakening positions of trade unions. But the 
heterogenic composition of company sizes intensifies the risk of erosion, since the 
social partners have evolved a main focus on the mega size companies in relation to 
sector level bargaining, leaving considerations on the needs and abilities of smaller 
firms out of the picture. Smaller firms without works council in Germany do not have 
shop stewards with direct links to the trade unions or strong networks (like in Den-
mark). They have therefore very limited possibilities to navigate in and profit from 
decentralisation schemes and both managers and employees may leave the bargaining 
system all together. If the membership rates continue to drop, the risk is that the or-
ganisations and the systems of representation get completely decoupled. An important 
question is therefore, how the social partners can keep or integrate the majority of 
SMEs in a collective bargaining system moving towards a multi level regulation handi-
capped by a dual structure of representation at company level. In times of falling 
membership rates (and therefore fewer resources) this manoeuvre is not easy, since it 
involves extra costs and extra work to handle a more diverse population of compa-
nies.
Perspectives
Our conclusion is in good accord with the findings of recent IR research, in which the 
question of the limits for organised decentralisation is becoming an increasingly central 
theme. The erosion trends appear from, for example, works by Margin-
son/Sisson/Arrowsmith (2003), Marginson/Sisson (2004) and Visser (2005). Margin-
son et al. speak of the corrosion of sector level agreements, when too much is dele-
gated to enterprise level. This new trend is particularly marked in Germany. For in-
stance, agreement-free areas based in high-tech enterprises are being developed in 
similar ways as in Great Britain (Marginson et al. 2003; Marginson/Sisson 2004). 
Visser concludes that the decisive role of sector level agreements is being attacked 
from various sides, and that their survival seems to be in part dependent on self-denial 
through the use of opening clauses and the like. He stresses that  with Scandinavia as 
an explicit exception  what is taking place is a “… process of institutional shrinkage 
of the collective agreement as a source of regulation.” (Visser 2005: 297).  
The problems are seen as a result of a loss of control by the hitherto dominant 
sector organisations. In our view, what is at stake is not just the question of control, 
but at least as much the development of relations at enterprise level. The question of a 
power balance is crucial at this level as well. Danish experience has shown that the 
organisations are willing to give up control, because they feel confident that the local 
parties are capable of carrying out the task in accordance with the negotiating culture 
that has evolved between the parties at sector level. This has been possible due to a 
single-channel system of representation and a relatively homogeneous composition of 
company sizes. There is therefore good reason why in Denmark, rather than speak of 
organised decentralisation, we use the term centralised decentralisation precisely to under-
score that a decisive element is the reproduction of the negotiating culture and of the 
main rules governing proceedings at the hitherto dominant sector level. In this way an 
ability to make distributive negotiations integrative has developed from top to bottom. 
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Furthermore, an integrative consensus-seeking negotiating culture has emerged at 
local level, and this has at the same time been accompanied by the right to conclude 
agreements (Walton/McKersie 1965; Walton et al. 1994; Due/Madsen 2006). As our 
empirical analysis shows, this difference in bargaining rights at company level makes 
decentralisation mean something different in Denmark and Germany. 
For these reasons the IR system has seen a renewal in the direction of a multi-
level regulation in which there is ample space for bottom-up processes based on hori-
zontal network control. This has not, however, led to erosion because the local parties 
are, so to speak, carrying on the culture despite the fact that the vertical control is so 
weakened that the sector level can no longer be regarded as the dominant centre. Here 
the parties are to a higher degree prepared to respond to signals from the enterprises. 
The balance has tipped. But the Danish model is intact. 
It should perhaps be added that there is one fly in the ointment  also in the 
Danish context. It is obvious that decentralisation has taken place in a cross field be-
tween the management prerogative and the right to conclude agreements, i.e., the 
conflict of interests fundamental to the regulation of pay and working conditions. 
Each time parties at sector level negotiate further decentralisation, employers have 
attempted to restrict the right to conclude agreements so that management can have 
the largest possible scope of action, while the unions have insisted that the collective 
bargaining rights must be fully delegated to the local level. So far, the collective bar-
gaining rights have been preserved, but  as already mentioned  with a certain trend 
towards individualisation. 
Despite the general belief within the trade union movement that decentralisation 
can be handled, it is still a major challenge. It not only requires a maintenance but also 
a strengthening of the local level and first and foremost of the union representatives at 
the enterprises (Visser 2005: 302). In some sector organisations it is possible to dis-
cern a certain anxiety that the local representatives will not be able to fulfil this task in 
the future if further decentralisation schemes are introduced. Even though formally 
they still have right to conclude agreements, it will be management at the enterprises 
that will have the real say, thereby undermining the process of centralised decentralisa-
tion. (Due/Madsen 2006).  
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